Only one month remains before the 13th National Parliamentary Election is held. The history of parliamentary elections in Bangladesh has not been very encouraging. According to the Constitution, if the continuity of holding parliamentary elections every five years had been maintained, the 14th National Parliamentary Election should have been held in 2026. But instead, the 13th National Parliamentary Election is going to be held on February 12. The politically conscious people of Bangladesh are well aware of the reasons behind this.
The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 12th national parliaments failed to complete their full five-year terms. Out of the 55 years of independent Bangladesh, 11 years—more than the full terms of two parliaments—were consumed by military rule and so-called army-backed unelected civilian governments. From the first national parliament formed after the Constitution was enacted until 2024, each of the 12 parliaments, on average, lasted just over three and a half years. However, even this average does not apply to all parliaments. Among them, the 6th parliament of 1996 lasted only 12 days, while the 12th parliament lasted just seven months.
Of the four elections held between 2008 and 2024, although the 2008 election was visibly claimed to be free, fair, and participatory, the election results proved that the Election Commission, along with the civil and military administration, did everything necessary to tilt the outcome in favor of the Awami League. The manner in which the subsequent three elections were held under Awami League governments not only tarnished and questioned the electoral system but also played a major role in eroding public trust and credibility in elections.
Under the naked sword of the Awami League, the Election Commission could not independently perform its duties as a constitutional institution in conducting the previous three elections (2014, 2018, and 2024). Out of fear of being beheaded, it merely followed whatever directives the government issued. Had even one Chief Election Commissioner been a person of integrity, honesty, and justice, he would have protested against unconstitutional and unlawful government orders. At the very least, he could have resigned, citing constant obstruction in performing his duties. That would have made it clear that what was happening was unjust, unconstitutional, and against public interest. Instead, the opposite occurred. All Chief Election Commissioners during the Awami League’s tenure claimed that elections held under them were free, fair, and neutral; that the administration fully cooperated; and that international observers toured polling centers and expressed satisfaction.
Against this backdrop, the role of the current Election Commission in restoring public trust is extremely important. Much depends on how impartially and efficiently it performs its duties in this election, being held under special circumstances. Already, some allegations have surfaced—much like the proverb “two outcomes from a single journey.” Candidates from certain parties who did not renounce dual or foreign citizenship had their nominations approved by Returning Officers. On the other hand, Jamaat-e-Islami candidates had their nominations rejected despite submitting certificates confirming renunciation of foreign citizenship. Similarly, in cases where court cases were pending, nominations from one party were accepted, while Jamaat candidates’ nominations were rejected—even though those candidates had previously contested elections in 2008 as valid candidates, submitted court clearance documents, and even won. Allegations of administrative bias in providing security to leaders of the two main opposition parties, BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami, have also been brought to the Election Commission’s attention.
Even if the upcoming 13th election is benchmarked against the 2008 election—rather than compared with all past elections—justice may still not be served. This is because a major party that governed the country for nearly half of its independent history is absent from the election. The two main contenders now are BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami. BNP has governed the country three times, including one partial term. Jamaat-e-Islami, however, has never had the opportunity to govern either Pakistan or Bangladesh.
In the 1991 parliamentary election, Jamaat achieved its highest success by securing 12–13 percent of the vote and winning 18 seats, with a total vote count of 4,136,661. In the 1996 election, either out of ambition to come to power or by tacitly allowing Awami League to defeat BNP, Jamaat fielded candidates in all 300 constituencies but won only three seats.
After 21 years, the Awami League formed a government. But did it embrace Jamaat afterward? No. Instead, it hoped that Jamaat would again distance itself from BNP in the 2001 election, allowing Awami League to return to power. When Jamaat instead aligned closely with BNP, Awami League’s anger was directed squarely at Jamaat. The party realized that unless Jamaat was “cut down to size,” it would not be possible for Awami League to return to power repeatedly without trouble.
India’s then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh further fueled this thinking. While hosting editors of five leading Delhi newspapers over tea, he stated that 25 percent of Bangladesh’s population supported Jamaat-e-Islami. Indian media seized upon this statement as supposed proof that Bangladesh was becoming a militant state. Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina, too, remained vigilant for an opportunity to eliminate Jamaat. That opportunity came after Awami League formed the government in 2009.
What followed—the brutality inflicted on Jamaat by the Awami League government, ruling party activists, affiliated organizations, and state law enforcement agencies—has no parallel in the modern world. Jamaat’s top leaders were executed through sham trials. Many others were subjected to enforced disappearances and killings. Countless people were rendered homeless.
The Awami League did not believe Jamaat could recover from this devastation. Intoxicated by power and self-praise, it failed to realize that the public was outraged by the killing of innocent Jamaat leaders under fabricated charges. Instead, through these extreme injustices, Awami League lost public trust, while sympathy for Jamaat grew significantly. Driven by relief from oppression and growing empathy, Jamaat’s vote share will undoubtedly increase in the upcoming election, along with a significant rise in seat numbers. However, based on my personal and political judgment, I do not believe Jamaat will be able to secure an outright majority to form a government.
Based on continuous observation of political developments, discussions with active political figures, extensive reading, and my professional assessment as a journalist, I conclude that Jamaat-e-Islami will perform quite well in the upcoming election and gain the opportunity to mature further by functioning as the principal opposition—participating in parliamentary debates and standing committees.
It is true that since the July uprising, the waters of the Meghna and Jamuna rivers seem to be flowing upstream. Support for the brutally oppressed Jamaat-Shibir during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure has surged. Within less than a year of the interim government, student support for Islami Chhatra Shibir increased so dramatically that its panels achieved landslide victories in DUCSU, RUCSU, CUCSU, JUCSU, and JnUCSU elections. Nearly 90,000 students voted in university student union elections nationwide. These students, along with their families and social networks, are likely to form Jamaat’s vote bank.
However, if we examine the experiences of the 2001 and 2008 elections, we see that in 2001 BNP won 193 seats with 40.97 percent of the vote, while Awami League secured 62 seats with 40.13 percent. BNP formed the government. In 2008, Awami League won 230 seats with 48.04 percent of the vote, while BNP received only 30 seats despite securing 32.50 percent of the vote. BNP’s popularity had not declined so sharply as to justify such a collapse in seats. Politically aware citizens may recall that prior to the 2008 election, Sheikh Hasina openly promised the Fakhruddin–Moeenuddin-backed government immunity for all extrajudicial actions committed during their tenure—a promise that directly helped bring her to power.
In 2008, a recently ousted but still popular BNP was forced to accept results widely deemed unacceptable. Given that precedent, there is doubt about how effectively Jamaat will be able to detect or counter election engineering.
Jamaat first contested elections in 1979 as part of the Islamic Democratic League (IDL) alliance with the Muslim League, winning six seats with 1,941,394 votes. Contesting alone in 1986, it won 10 seats with 1,314,059 votes. In 1991, it won 18 seats with 4,136,611 votes—its highest-ever tally. In 2008, under significant pressure and contesting as part of the BNP alliance, Jamaat fielded only 30 candidates yet secured a respectable 3,289,967 votes.
The number of voters has increased significantly since 2008. In 2024, the voter count stood at 119,689,289; it has now risen to 127,695,183—an increase of more than eight million in two years. Female voter growth has outpaced male growth, with female voters increasing by 4.16 percent compared to 2.29 percent for men. The difference between male and female voters is now only about 1.95 million. Although exact figures are unavailable, voters aged 18–29—including first-time voters—are estimated to make up about 25 percent of the electorate.
For Jamaat, the first obstacle to success in power politics is opposition from anti-Jamaat Islamist parties and followers of religious leaders. Jamaat will also struggle to attract Awami League’s core voters and minority communities traditionally considered its “vote bank.” In Awami League’s absence, some of its supporters may abstain from voting, while those who do vote are more likely to support BNP rather than Jamaat.
Jamaat candidates are likely to attract centrist voters—those who endured 16 years of Awami League repression, extortion, killings, looting, and land grabs, and who have grown disillusioned by the conduct of mid-level BNP leaders and activists over the past year and a half. Many now see Jamaat as their potential rescuer. The long-awaited moment is fast approaching.
Author: US-based senior journalist.
