Whether neighboring country India is our friend or foe — that question has remained unanswered for 54 years. The common perception is that those who fought for Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 consider India a friend, while those who fought against the country view it as an enemy. Beyond that, every government that came to power has shaped the relationship with India to serve its own interests. Some call India an elder brother, while others say it behaves like a bully.
As a large neighboring country surrounding Bangladesh on three sides, India has often taken advantage of its position—sometimes through policy, sometimes through diplomacy. Yet, India has not always been the one seeking opportunities; we ourselves have often given away more than was asked. Fluctuations in relations between neighbors are natural, but during the past 16 years, India’s unreserved support for all the wrongdoings of the Awami League government has pushed it far from the hearts of ordinary Bangladeshis. Alienating the people, India secured “its own people” under its protection. Many of its investments and expectations were buried in the dust of the July Revolution.
Now, in today’s reality, a new game has begun. Outwardly, there is anti-India rhetoric, but behind the scenes, a competition in appeasing India is underway. In a frantic pursuit of power, a new polarization is forming. To seize power, one needs pro-India votes. Ballot boxes must be filled—whether with Rahim’s or Ram’s votes. Many are trying to shake hands with the “big brothers” to win Ram’s vote while keeping Rahim’s in their pockets. They want the Awami League to be banned, yet they also want its votes to win power. If that’s the case, then how will the debt of blood from the July Revolution ever be repaid?
The influence of the United States and neighboring India on Bangladesh’s politics has always existed and continues to this day. Russia, too, once held significant influence, and China still does. But the impact of the U.S. and India has always been the strongest.
Everyone knows the names of the U.S. ambassadors and Indian high commissioners who served in Bangladesh since 2003 because many of them played very active roles in its politics. The list includes:
U.S. Ambassadors: Harry K. Thomas Jr. (May 27, 2003 – July 2, 2005), Patricia A. Butenis (Feb 21, 2006 – Jun 23, 2007), James F. Moriarty (Mar 26, 2008 – Jun 17, 2011), Nicholas Dean (acting, Jun 17 – Nov 24, 2011), Dan W. Mozena (May 16, 2011 – Jan 12, 2015), Marcia Bernicat (Nov 18, 2014 – Nov 2, 2018), Earl R. Miller (Oct 11, 2018 – Jan 21, 2022), Peter D. Haas (Dec 18, 2021 – Jul 23, 2024), Helen LaFave (acting, Jul 23 – Nov 1, 2024), Megan Boldin (acting, Nov 1, 2024 – Jan 10, 2025), and currently Tracy Ann Jacobson (acting).
Indian High Commissioners: Veena Sikri (Dec 2003 – Nov 2006), Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty (Jan 2007 – Dec 2009), Rajeet Mitter (Dec 2009 – Oct 2011), Pankaj Saran (Mar 2012 – Dec 2015), Harsh Vardhan Shringla (Jan 2016 – Jan 2019), Riva Ganguly Das (Mar 2019 – Oct 2020), Vikram Kumar Doraiswami (Oct 2020 – Sep 2022), and Pranay Kumar Verma (Sep 2022 – present).
Before and after the 1/11 political changeover, U.S. ambassadors Harry K. Thomas, Patricia Butenis, and Indian high commissioners Veena Sikri and Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty were notably active. After the Awami League came to power in 2008, it sought to prolong its rule—with India’s full support and the U.S.’s opposition. That led to the deterioration of ties with Washington.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and senior Awami League leaders, including General Secretary Syed Ashraful Islam, publicly mocked U.S. officials. At a party rally in Khulna on November 29, 2014, Ashraf called visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Nisha Desai Biswal a “two-anna minister,” saying Khaleda Zia had begged before her for power. He also ridiculed Ambassador Mozena as “maidservant Marjina,” alleging he tried everything to prevent the 2015 election and Sheikh Hasina’s return as prime minister. “Bangladesh is not in a position where maidservant Marjina can change its government,” he said.
Ashraf also mocked the BNP for hoping that Modi’s rise to power would favor them, claiming, “Remember, Modi is an even stronger supporter of the Awami League than Manmohan Singh was.” His remarks revealed the Awami League’s real relations with both the U.S. and India.
Later, U.S. Ambassador Marcia Bernicat was attacked in Dhaka’s Mohammadpur, and Peter D. Haas was denied an audience with Sheikh Hasina before eventually being forced to leave Bangladesh. In his farewell statement, Haas said, “I did not expect to leave Dhaka this way.”
From 2003 until the July Revolution of 2024, the Awami League’s rapport with Indian high commissioners was the closest in history. With India’s full support, the party became increasingly arrogant and reckless—until the inevitable happened. In the July Revolution, Sheikh Hasina, estranged from her people, fled back to India. The student–public uprising was not only against the Awami League but also a manifestation of anger toward India for its unwavering support of her regime. The anti-India and anti-Awami sentiment now surging among Bangladeshis was created by none other than the Awami League and India themselves.
Whether any foreign power played a role in the July Revolution remains undisclosed, though those who know, know. On July 28, 2024, former U.S. Ambassador Dan Mozena told Time Television in an interview that the quota movement could trigger “the rise of new political parties or the revival of old ones.” He added, “I support a multiparty process in Bangladesh. Political stagnation has persisted for decades; it must be broken through meaningful reform. India, in its self-interest, may support the reintegration of a failing state on its border, perhaps with help from international friends. Sanctions could be imposed on security personnel responsible for atrocities. Support for a multiparty democratic process in Bangladesh could emerge.”
Everything Mozena said in that interview is now unfolding: the rise of the new National Citizens’ Party (NCP) and the revival of other old political forces. So, it would be naïve to think the revolution happened merely because students and the public took to the streets.
Bangladesh has always been a playing field for many powers—and it still is. Perhaps it always will be, as long as we keep offering ourselves up to be played with. We seem uncomfortable unless others interfere in our affairs. The power brokers want to play with us, and we eagerly give them the chance—just to hold onto power.
The July uprising indeed toppled a fascist regime, but now many are once again courting the same foreign powers that had kept Bangladesh in chains for 16 years. Everyone’s ultimate goal seems to be power. As the song goes: “First, I want power. Second, I want power. Finally, I want power.” Many no longer trust the people; they hold Rahim’s votes in their pockets and now want the votes of the Awami League and of Ram. If joining hands with the neighbor secures both vote banks, that’s enough.
But if power, stripped of all principles and ideals, is the only goal—then why did Abu Sayeed and others sacrifice their blood?
The writer is Executive Editor, Bangladesh Pratidin
