It has been one week since the departure of the interim government led by Prof Yunus. During this week, we have been stunned by reports of various irregularities, authoritarian practices, corruption, and nepotism associated with this so-called civil society–backed government. From the Head of State to an ordinary rickshaw puller, it seems as though everyone has finally been able to breathe again.
In an interview with the leading daily, Kaler Kantho, the President remarked that he has been feeling better over the past week. On a television channel, a rickshaw puller was heard saying, “The Yunus government is gone; there are no more sudden road blockades at every turn. Now we are doing well.” There appears to be a wave of relief everywhere following the government’s departure. From small traders to large industrial entrepreneurs, from junior employees to homemakers – people seem to be breathing freely at last, celebrating a sense of liberation. The departure of the Yunus government has become the biggest good news for Bangladesh.
Why does the fall of a government bring such joy and celebration? The answer lies in the 18 months of misrule under the interim administration. During this period, under the guise of governance, the interim government established what many describe as a regime of arbitrariness. Mob violence, violations of law and the Constitution, looting, and corruption became widespread. Ordinary citizens felt helpless. Silently, they endured the oppression of mobs allegedly supported by the government.
Many have compared Prof Yunus’s 18-month rule to the dystopian kingdom depicted in Satyajit Ray’s film “Hirak Rajar Deshe”. Others have drawn parallels with the military-backed “1/11” government of 2007. Notably, several similarities can be found between the unelected government of 2007 led by Prof Fakhruddin Ahmed and the Yunus-led interim administration. Both governments came to power amid political crises. Both were dominated by members of the so-called civil society. Both assumed office with significant public support. Yet both left office deeply unpopular.
Under the banner of political reform, both governments were accused of promoting depoliticisation. The Fakhruddin government attempted to impose the controversial “minus formula,” ignoring public opinion. Similarly, under the guise of the “July Charter,” the Yunus administration sought to draft a new constitution. Both governments failed to effectively address economic challenges. Both were accused of undermining the private sector.
The Fakhruddin administration was criticised for harassing, arresting, and intimidating private industrialists, allegedly engaging in extortion under state patronage. It was accused of using the Anti-Corruption Commission to damage the image of the private sector and of conducting media trials to discredit business leaders. In a similar vein, critics allege that the Yunus government declared war on the private sector – harassing entrepreneurs, filing sweeping murder cases against them, and freezing bank accounts, as though attempting to complete the unfinished agenda of the 1/11 government.
The 1/11 government was also accused of trying to silence the media, using select outlets to conduct character assassination campaigns against political leaders and business figures. Critics argue that such practices expanded further during the Yunus administration.
Another alleged similarity was the formation of loyalist enforcement groups. The 1/11 government reportedly created a state-backed force under certain military officials. According to critics, the Yunus government allowed similar groups to operate nationwide, allegedly composed of misguided youth with tacit backing from the interim authorities.
Analyzed in this way, some argue that the Yunus-led interim government represented an extended version of the 1/11 administration – attempting to accomplish what Fakhruddin had sought but failed to complete.
A major similarity between the two governments, critics claim, was the use of grand promises. During the Fakhruddin era, then Army chief General Moeen U Ahmed offered numerous assurances to the public. During the interim government, Prof Yunus presented what critics describe as grand, almost propagandist assurances. If the public had been captivated by Moeen’s promises in 2007, they were, some argue, even more spellbound by Yunus’s words in 2024. Initially, people were excited by these promises, but later became disillusioned when confronted with reality.
In Bangladesh’s 54-year history, the combined tenure of these two civil society-backed governments amounted to less than four years – about 42 months. Yet many describe those 42 months as a dark and turbulent chapter. During this time, a perception grew among sections of the public that representatives of the country’s civil society are unfit to govern. They speak eloquently when outside power, but fail to uphold their own principles once in office. They say one thing, do another, and believe yet something else.
Critics argue that many among the influential civil society elite are driven not by public welfare but by self-interest, and that their accountability lies more with foreign patrons than with the people of Bangladesh.
These two administrations, in the eyes of their detractors, demonstrated that giving advice is easy, but governing a country is difficult. Running the state, they argue, is the responsibility of elected politicians. Civil society’s role, perhaps, is better suited to talk shows and seminars. Each group, they conclude, should focus on its proper domain.
Audite Karim is a writer and playwright. Email: [email protected]
