A recent “policy stance” by the interim government has sparked intense debate in the political arena and left the general public feeling anxious. The government’s favourable view of a proposed “humanitarian corridor” to Myanmar’s Rakhine state has taken many by surprise. Should the government proceed with such a decision, it would be nothing short of suicidal—posing a direct threat to our sovereignty and independence.
The first indication of creating a corridor through Bangladesh to deliver “humanitarian aid” to endangered ethnic groups in Rakhine emerged in February. On 7 February, in New York, Khalilur Rahman—then the high representative of the chief adviser to the interim government on the Rohingya crisis and priority issues—discussed the “humanitarian channel” with UN Secretary-General António Guterres.
A month later, during his visit to Bangladesh in March, the UN Secretary-General emphasised the urgent need for the international community and Myanmar’s neighbouring countries to exert greater pressure to end the fighting and restore democracy in Myanmar. He stressed that the first step must be to end the violence and implement effective measures to pave the way for a genuine democratic solution—one that would naturally facilitate the repatriation of Rohingya refugees.
His remarks underscored two key points: firstly, that Bangladesh should maintain communication with the Arakan Army, despite it being an armed insurgent group; and secondly, that Bangladesh should create a channel (or corridor) to send aid into Rakhine.
On 8 April, citing Khalilur Rahman, media outlets reported that a “humanitarian aid channel” to Rakhine would soon be established through Bangladesh.
Notably, when Rahman met the UN Secretary-General in February, he served as the special representative for the Rohingya crisis. The day after his April statement regarding the corridor, he was appointed as the National Security Adviser.
Subsequently, on 27 April, Foreign Adviser Md Tawhid Hossain informed journalists that the interim government had “in principle” agreed to the UN’s request for a corridor to deliver humanitarian aid to war-torn Rakhine. This announcement triggered strong backlash within political circles.
The BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami have both criticised the government over the corridor issue.
BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir stated, “Before making such a decision, the government should have consulted all political parties.” He added, “The BNP does not want to see another Gaza-like situation in this region.”
Jamaat Ameer Dr Shafiqur Rahman also demanded clarity on the matter.
The question arises: why has an unelected interim government taken such a critical policy decision without consulting political parties? Was it solely because the UN requested it? Has the UN always acted in Bangladesh’s best interests? Will the UN take responsibility if a new state emerges in this region or if war breaks out along our borders? Is the UN equally vocal about human rights crises elsewhere in the world?
Without domestic political consensus and regional agreement—including with Myanmar’s junta, the Arakan Army, and other key stakeholders—the proposed corridor could pose military and security risks for Bangladesh.
Is there any realistic prospect that, in exchange for this corridor, the nearly 1.1 million Rohingya refugees currently in Bangladesh might be repatriated to Myanmar, particularly to Rakhine? Given that the Arakan Army does not recognise Rohingyas—viewing them as Bangladeshi Muslims due to their religious identity—there is no reason to believe they would support their return. Moreover, the Myanmar government has expelled Rohingyas for the same reason. In essence, the junta and the Arakan Army share similar stances on the Rohingya issue.
Does the UN, or indeed Bangladesh’s interim government, believe that aiding the Arakan Army—an armed group fighting for autonomy—will somehow facilitate Rohingya repatriation? If so, what role does the junta play in this vision? The military regime has already expressed opposition to such a corridor.
There are legitimate concerns that establishing a humanitarian corridor into Rakhine could draw Bangladesh into a proxy war. Additionally, there are fears that armed groups operating along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border and within the hill tracts could become more active, creating further instability.
Cox’s Bazar and the hill tracts are of critical strategic importance to Bangladesh. Cox’s Bazar, the country’s most prominent tourist destination, has already suffered due to a past government’s missteps—hosting over one million Rohingyas since 2017. That government failed to ensure their repatriation, damaging the area’s tourism appeal and subjecting it to severe environmental strain. If a “humanitarian corridor” is now established, the country’s primary source of tourism revenue could collapse. Cox’s Bazar—a scenic haven—could become a conflict zone, threatening national stability.
A review of global “humanitarian corridors” reveals a troubling trend: countries that have hosted such corridors often suffered grave consequences. Security threats intensified, and civilians were sometimes targeted in attacks.
For example, during 1938–39, Jewish children were evacuated from Nazi-controlled areas to the UK—a deeply traumatic episode.
In the Bosnian War (1992–95) and the Syrian conflict (2018), humanitarian corridors were established to evacuate civilians, yet both proved disastrous.
The Lachin corridor, created during the first Armenia-Azerbaijan war (Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) in 1989, was closed by Azerbaijan within two years due to security risks.
In 1993, the UN Security Council declared Srebrenica a “safe area,” but due to a lack of adequate protection, it ultimately led to the 1995 genocide.
Similar failures occurred in Yemen and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2008), where humanitarian corridors became enmeshed in broader military conflicts.
If Bangladesh considers these precedents, what consequences might it face by establishing such a corridor? The most immediate risk would be an influx of refugees from Rakhine. Already burdened with 1.1 million Rohingyas, Bangladesh simply cannot accommodate more—especially in the current global climate.
Secondly, the ongoing conflict in Rakhine between the Arakan Army and Myanmar’s military may spill over into Cox’s Bazar or even further into Bangladesh. Western powers may harbour long-term strategic interests in Rakhine, and such a corridor could encourage aspirations for an independent Rakhine state—threatening Bangladesh’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Peace in Bangladesh must not be jeopardised. Those making such decisions must act with the utmost caution.
Moreover, the interim government is temporary and lacks a public mandate. Its principal role is to facilitate the transfer of power to elected representatives. It has neither the authority nor the legitimacy to make sensitive policy decisions of this magnitude. As the BNP’s acting chairman rightly observed, such a decision should be deferred until elected representatives can deliberate on it.
We must not compromise our sovereignty merely to satisfy external actors. The country must come first—this is what all stakeholders must remember.
Writer: Playwright and columnist. Email: [email protected]
Bd-pratidin English/ Jisan
