Stressing the need for political and institutional reforms, Constitution Reform Commission Chief Ali Riaz said that reforms must be carried out based on the social bonding of the citizens.
The countrymen are experiencing one of the most turbulent periods in the politics of post-independence Bangladesh. In the wake of the unprecedented July mass upsurge, it is a time of both uncertainty and potential.
However, it is the culmination of 53 years of Bangladesh’s political and governance history. In this circumstance, the question of political and institutional reform must be considered. For 53 years,
Bangladeshi politics has been passing through a state of persistent oscillation over the past 53 years, he said, marking the 15th anniversary of Kaler Kantho, one of the leading Bangla newspapers in the country.
The countrymen have been passing their days amidst crises and possibilities, hope and disappointment and during this time, the system of governance has undergone numerous changes, he said.
Although the journey began with a parliamentary system in 1972, it came to an end within three and a half years as Bangladesh transitioned into a one-party presidential system. But, it was brought to an end through a military coup.
After a prolonged history of military rule spanning over a decade and a half, Bangladesh saw the return of the parliamentary system in 1991 through a mass uprising.
However, the promise heralded by the renewed journey of democratic Bangladesh gradually faded.
During this period, a two-party political system emerged, but instead of fostering democratic institutions, a form of “prime ministerial governance” was introduced in the country in 1991.
The system of centralised power, whose seeds were embedded in the 1972 Constitution, became increasingly evident through various amendments.
Despite the centralisation of power between 1991 and 2006, a partially acceptable electoral system, freedom of the media and judiciary and a sense of optimism among citizens were upheld a bit.
The system, on the one hand, ensured citizens' voting rights but gradually weakened state institutions.
However, by the end of 2006, conflicts among political parties, rising violence and the intense desire to retain or seize power reached a point where the continuity of the processes came into question.
The limited democracy that characterised this period came to an end and the military reemerged in Bangladesh’s politics.
A military-backed civilian caretaker government generated hopes that they would address the structural weaknesses in the governing system that had trapped Bangladeshi politics in a vicious cycle and undertake reforms to fix these issues.
When Awami League came to power in 2009, Sheikh Hasina, president of the party, faced two choices. The first was to address the structural weaknesses in governance that persisted from 1991 to 2006 and to draw lessons from the experience of military-backed rule in 2007–08.
This would involve reforming the state apparatus, building and strengthening democratic institutions and establishing systems of accountability.
The second option was to revert to the pre-2006 trajectory, maintaining a fragile state and democratic framework characterised by ongoing political conflict, limited institutional stability and the cyclical transfer of power every five years, with political and state resources to be under control of some few hands.
Instead of addressing the issues, Sheikh Hasina opted not only to suppress opposition and dissent but also to move toward centralised power by systematically dismantling state institutions.
And, a critical step in this direction was the 15th Amendment to the Constitution. In this context, 2011 marked the first milestone in the deterioration of democracy in Bangladesh.
Subsequently, both legal and extralegal measures, such as enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and fabricated cases, became more prevalent. Laws like the Digital Security Act were also enacted to tighten control.
Sheikh Hasina hanged on to power without any mandate from the people through rigging in the election, uncontested victories and midnight elections since 2014.
Remarkably, an authoritarian regime was established after 2011, while a significant shift occurred after the national election held in 2014 and then Sheikh Hasina became more authoritarian and also destroyed all state organs intending to hang on to power forever.
Following the mass uprising of 2024, the question of reforming the state has come to the forefront. It must be noted that the demand for institutional reform of the state has existed within society for a long time.
In 2007, the military-backed government addressed a limited aspect of this issue by focusing on political parties.
Although there was public enthusiasm for such reforms, the reform initiatives were not implemented. The proposed reforms overlooked fundamental aspects of the state structure, governance system and constitutional and legal frameworks.
While they created a superficial sense of change, their implementation proved unfeasible.
Moreover, those in power lacked a clear vision and their ascent to authority did not occur through public participation.
The interim government and the student leaders at the forefront of the movement have spoken about reforms and a new political settlement.
Rebuilding the shattered state structure requires a complete overhaul of institutional frameworks and this is not a short-term task, but initiating the process is imperative.
Even more crucial is identifying the roots of the rise of authoritarianism and establishing a consensus among political and social forces on the immediate steps needed to prevent the emergence of such regimes in the future.
This consensus should never be viewed as a political agreement between the interim government and political parties for the transfer of power.
Instead, it must be regarded as a social contract between political forces and the citizens. If this consensus is not viewed in this way and elevated to this status, it will remain a mere formality on paper.
In this context, the role of the interim government can be seen as that of a facilitator. However, it is important to remember that this government has assumed responsibility as a representative of the people’s aspirations.
It represents the very citizens whose blood and lives have paved the way for these reforms and the possibility of a new social bonding.
