A massive corruption mechanism involving the appointment of project directors under the Road Transport and Bridges Ministry during Obaidul Quader’s tenure has come to light.
Investigation reveals that top posts were handed out in exchange for hefty bribes—establishing what many insiders termed an “auction culture” within the ministry.
The Dhaka-Rangpur Highway Development Project, approved by the Executive Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) in 2014, has emerged as a prime example of this malpractice. That year in March, the Road Division began the process of appointing a project director (PD), a procedure typically handled by a selection committee headed by a secretary. However, then Road Transport and Bridges Minister Obaidul Quader reportedly overrode this protocol, insisting he would make the appointment himself.
A shortlist of seven candidates, along with their CVs, was submitted to Quader. Within days, contractors began contacting those on the list.
The Development Project Proposal (DPP) initially set the project’s budget at Tk757 crore, which was later inflated to Tk1,375 crore in three phases. One candidate reportedly agreed to pay Tk10 crore to secure the post of project director, a sum arranged by a contractor in exchange for being awarded the project work. The highest bidder was eventually appointed.
This incident was not isolated. Over his 12 and a half years as minister, Obaidul Quader allegedly oversaw a pattern in which top posts were sold in exchange for advance payments. Investigations suggest that individuals seeking the PD role were instructed to pay 5% of the total project budget upfront, often after the project cost had already been inflated by 30% during the DPP stage. Without this payment, no candidate could move forward in the appointment process.
Appointments were subject to approval by a syndicate allegedly led by Quader and involving key figures including his wife Ishratunnesa Quader, brother Abdul Quader Mirza, former Feni MP Nizam Uddin Hazari, and former Noakhali MP Ekramul Karim Chowdhury. Aspirants reportedly negotiated payments with members of this inner circle depending on who they had access to.
Multiple former project directors have begun speaking out, including one who was promised the PD position for a BRTA project involving the purchase of 137 buses. After paying Tk1 crore out of a committed Tk10 crore, he failed to clear the balance. This reportedly angered Quader, and the project was cancelled as a result.
In some cases, even after a project was finalised, no director was appointed because candidates refused to meet the financial demands. A separate internal PD syndicate also formed, with a handful of officials repeatedly tasked with handling major projects—some managing as many as eight projects simultaneously. These PDs allegedly used funds gained from contractors to secure further appointments, creating a cycle of mutual benefit and corruption.
Contractors, too, formed a network. Between 2011 and 2024, around 90% of the Roads and Highways Department’s work was handled by just 12 to 15 contractors, most of whom reportedly influenced project director appointments in exchange for project allocations.
Investigations found that contractors brought their preferred candidates to Quader’s syndicate, settled bribe amounts, and paid on the condition that the project work would be awarded to them.
This deeply rooted system compromised project quality and accountability. Work was often delayed, costs spiralled, and end results suffered from poor execution. In one example, the Dhaka-Mymensingh road project saw the cost of appointing a PD increase threefold, inflating the total budget nearly twelve times.
Obaidul Quader, known for personally visiting project sites, allegedly forced project directors and contractors to bear extra costs for his visits—ranging from entertainment expenses to direct cash payments. Journalists accompanying him were allegedly paid Tk5,000 to Tk10,000 each via bKash. His entourage had to be hosted lavishly, and special gifts arranged. Only after fulfilling these “requirements” would a project bill be cleared.
For Quader’s close allies, however, an alternative system existed. They reportedly paid one-time sums to bypass formalities. An internal estimate revealed that up to 50% of many project budgets went into bribes and other unofficial expenditures, with only the remaining half used for actual work. Still, this did not deter contractors—thanks to inflated DPPs, they profited despite the corruption.
For instance, a road project that should have cost Tk50 crore was estimated at Tk100–110 crore. Even after spending Tk50 crore in bribes, contractors would make substantial profits—turning public infrastructure into a lucrative venture for the syndicate.
Throughout Quader’s tenure, secretaries, engineers, and bureaucrats of the ministry were rendered virtually powerless. Decision-making was centralised among Quader, his chosen project directors, and favoured contractors, while officials were reduced to simply processing files and signing them as instructed.
Bd-pratidin English/TR
